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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 12-3956
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL RICHARD ROBERTS,
Appellant
________________
No. 12-3957
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY JAMES DEMARCO, III,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action Nos. 2-10-cr-00790-002/1)
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 14, 2014
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2014)

________________
OPINION
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
I.

Background
Anthony DeMarco, Michael Roberts, and two other individuals were indicted for

their participation in a massive mortgage foreclosure rescue scheme. DeMarco was
charged with, inter alia, conspiracy, wire fraud, bank fraud, mail fraud, and money
laundering. Roberts was charged with, inter alia, conspiracy, bank fraud, and wire fraud.
DeMarco and Roberts both pled guilty. In October 2012, the District Court sentenced
DeMarco to 300 months’ incarceration and five years’ supervised release, and ordered
him to pay a special assessment of $1,000. The District Court sentenced Roberts to 120
months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release, and ordered him to pay a
$1,000 special assessment. In May 2013, the District Court entered a final order of
restitution, ordering DeMarco to pay approximately $20 million and Roberts to pay
approximately $6 million. Each appeals.1
Roberts argues that the District Court erred by increasing his offense level two
points under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 for an abuse of a position of trust. DeMarco asserts that
the District Court erred by denying him funds for a forensic accountant to evaluate the
Government’s restitution calculations. Both Roberts and DeMarco contend that the
District Court improperly failed to account for unpaid sellers’ rent in its calculation of the
1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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restitution owed to the victim sellers, and that the District Court imposed substantively
unreasonable sentences. The Government has filed a consolidated opposition brief. We
affirm.
II.

Discussion

Roberts’ Abuse of Position of Public or Private Trust
Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that the offense level should
be increased by two levels if “the defendant abused a position of public or private trust,
or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or
concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.

A position of “public or private trust”

is one “characterized by professional or managerial discretion.” Id. cmt. n.1. The
adjustment applies only if “the position of public or private trust . . . contributed in some
significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense.” Id. We
review de novo (also known as plenary review) whether a defendant occupied a position
of trust, and review for clear error whether he used his position of trust to facilitate
significantly the offense. United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 1999).
Roberts argues that he was merely one of DeMarco’s employees and did not hold
a position of trust with respect to the victims in this case. The record indicates, however,
that Roberts was the vice president of sales at DeMarco’s company for several months
and was aware of the fraudulent nature of DeMarco’s scheme. Despite this knowledge,
Roberts directly communicated with and solicited victim sellers, gaining their trust and
assisting them with complicated real estate transactions. Given the record, the District
Court correctly found that Roberts had abused a position of trust.
3

DeMarco’s Motion for Funds for a Forensic Accountant
We review the District Court’s denial of a request for funds to retain an expert
witness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir.
1997). DeMarco contends that the District Court wrongly denied his motion for approval
of approximately $30,000 in Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) funding to pay an expert
forensic accountant to recalculate restitution. The CJA provides for funds for
“investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation.” 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). Here, DeMarco has not shown that an expert accountant’s
services were necessary. Although he argues that an expert could have challenged the
Government’s fraud loss calculation, it is unrealistic to think that an expert could have
reduced DeMarco’s loss calculation enough to warrant a lower Guidelines offense level.
The Court found DeMarco responsible for a total fraud loss of over $17 million, far
above the “cut off” of $7 million that would have triggered a lower offense level. See
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2013). Additionally, the Court properly found that, given the
enormous loss amount in the case and that DeMarco had virtually no liquid assets, it was
inappropriate to dedicate CJA funding to the topic of restitution. See DeMarco’s Joint
Appendix (“J.A.”) at 17 (given the multi-million dollar amount of restitution and
defendants’ lack of assets, “it would be unconscionable for Court appointed defense
counsel to spend any further time trying to ‘fine tune’ the amount of restitution when
there was no realistic possibility that DeMarco . . . was able to make restitution to any of
[his] many victims”). The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying DeMarco’s
motion for funds to pay an expert witness.
4

Exclusion of Unpaid Rent in Restitution Calculations
“We exercise plenary review over whether an award of restitution is permitted
under law, but we review specific awards for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1995). Both DeMarco and Roberts argue that the
District Court improperly calculated restitution by failing to exclude unpaid sellers’ rents
from the total restitution award. Specifically, they contend that some victim sellers failed
to pay rent to DeMarco’s company, and that this “benefit” should be subtracted from the
restitution they owe the victims. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to offset DeMarco’s and Roberts’ restitution obligations by the victims’
allegedly unpaid rents. As the District Court correctly found, DeMarco and Roberts had
not sustained their burden of showing that such a “rent credit” should be allowed, as they
presented no evidence of which sellers failed to make particular rent payments for
particular properties. See United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 254 (3d Cir. 2011) (it is
the defendant’s burden to prove any restitution offsets).
Substantive Reasonableness of Sentences
Both DeMarco and Roberts argue that the sentences imposed by the District Court
were substantively unreasonable. “The party challenging the sentence bears the ultimate
burden of proving its unreasonableness and we accord great deference to a district court’s
choice of final sentence.” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007)
(internal citation omitted). Here, neither defendant has shown that his sentence was
unreasonable. DeMarco and Roberts participated in a massive fraud that significantly
harmed the lives of numerous innocent people. The District Court heard victim
5

testimony, considered the nature of the fraud and the role both defendants played in
perpetuating the fraud, accounted for the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
and ultimately imposed sentences that were within the Guidelines range. There is no
basis to find that the District Court’s sentences were unreasonable.
*

*

*

For these reasons, we affirm.
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